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  The existing discussions about the origins of the Asian crisis can be 
summarized into two broad views: the “economic fundamentals” view and 
the “financial panic” view.  This paper attempts to distinguish between 
these two views empirically by testing external solvency and examining 
intertemporal borrowing constraints of the three most-affected countries: 
Thailand, Indonesia and Korea.  The evidence indicates that while the 
external solvency condition was generally satisfied in Indonesia and Korea 
in the pre-crisis period, it was not in the case for Thailand with a sample 
extending to the 1990s when massive capital inflows took place and 
external liabilities of the economy became unsustainable. This suggests 
that poor economic fundamentals were the main origins of the Thai crisis 
while financial panic was a more plausible cause of the Indonesian and 
Korean crises. 
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1. Introduction 
Numerous research papers, books, and proceedings have been produced 
attempting to identify the potential sources of the Asian crisis in 1997.  The 
existing discussions on origins of the Asian crisis can be summarized into two 
broad views: the “economic fundamentals view” and the “financial panic view.”    In 
the economic fundamentals view, the Asian crisis is attributed to weak economic 
fundamentals such as inconsistent economic policies, overspending in the private 
sector, and vulnerable financial systems.  It implies that the currency crisis was 
an inevitable consequence of bad fundamentals.  In the financial panic view, it is 
believed that even though economic fundamentals were basically sound and did 
not warrant a crisis, international creditors suddenly changed their expectations 
and lost confidence about the behavior of other creditors (i.e. fear that other 
depositors would withdraw their investments), so that they refused to roll over 
credit.    This resulted in bank runs and other forms of self-fulfilling financial panic 
that caused the crisis (see, e.g., Glick 1998 and Chang 1998).     
There are at least two important policy implications that distinguish between 
the two alternative views.  First, in planning post-crisis recovery, if bad 
fundamentals were the main sources of the crisis, macroeconomic policy and 
financial sector reforms are crucial ingredients for the policy package.  If, on the 
other hand, the crisis was mainly caused by a financial panic, these reforms are 
not necessarily indispensable.  Second, the two views also have different 
implications on the issue of whether there should be an international lender of last 
resort.  If economic fundamentals were the primary origins, the existence of such 
facility may be of little use.  Conversely, it could actually induce a government to 
continue bad policy practices.  If, however, the financial panic explanation were 
more plausible, international investors would have no reason to panic with the 
presence of an international lender of last resort, and therefore it would be helpful 
to prevent crises.   3 
Which view is a more credible explanation of the Asian crisis?  The existing 
literature has not yet fully investigated this question, as we briefly survey in the 
next section.  In particular, there seems to be no formal econometric assessment 
to compare these two views of the Asian crisis.    This paper attempts to answer the 
above question by focusing on a summary indicator of economic fundamentals that 
helps identify the source of a crisis: external solvency.  Suppose a country did not 
satisfy its intertemporal external borrowing constraint because of inconsistent 
macroeconomic policies or overspending in the private sector, and therefore 
became insolvent internationally.  Then massive capital outflows and a 
subsequent crisis would be unavoidable due to bad fundamentals.    If, on the other 
hand, a country satisfied the solvency condition but nevertheless a crisis broke out, 
then the crisis may be attributed to a self-fulfilling panic under international 
illiquidity, where there was a maturity mismatch between short-term liabilities 
and long-term assets in the financial sector. 
To formally investigate external solvency, we apply testing procedures developed 
in the literature relating to government solvency problems (e.g. Hamilton and 
Flavin 1986; Hakkio and Rush 1991; Haug 1991; Trehan and Walsh 1991; and 
Ahmed and Rogers 1995).  Among others, Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Ahmed 
and Rogers (1995) discussed a more general, stochastic environment and 
examined the sustainability of external deficits as well as government deficits in 
developed countries.  Sawada (1994) adopted a similar approach to the 
international debt problems in the heavily indebted countries of Latin America 
and Asia in the 1980s.   
 Following this line of research, this paper investigates the external solvency in 
East Asia in the context of the recent crisis.  In particular, we examine the cases 
of three affected countries: Thailand, Indonesia and Korea.  Note that in these 
countries, IMF rescue packages were needed and the crises were more severe than 
in neighboring countries such as Malaysia and the Philippines.  Moreover, as is   4 
discussed in the following section, the existing evidence actually suggests that 
these three countries were internationally illiquid just before the crisis broke out 
(Chang and Velasco 1998) and therefore satisfied the conditions of a liquidity crisis. 
For these reasons, our investigation is particularly focused on the cases of these 
three countries. 
Anticipating the main findings here, our evidence indicates that while the 
external borrowing constraint was generally satisfied in Indonesia and Korea in 
the pre-crisis period, it was not in the case of Thailand with a sample extending to 
the 1990s when massive capital inflows took place and external liabilities of the 
economy became unsustainable. This suggests that economic fundamentals were 
the main origins of the Thai crisis and financial panic was the more likely cause of 
the Indonesian and Korean crises. 
The structure of this paper is as follows.  Subsequent to this introduction, 
Section 2 provides a brief survey on the origins of the Asian crisis.  Section 3 
explains the econometric framework.  Section 4 offers the empirical evidence.  
The final section gives concluding remarks. 
 
2. Brief Survey of the Origins of the Asian Crisis   
This section briefly summarizes the existing explanations on the causes of the 
Asian crisis.  As mentioned above, quite a few books, articles and proceedings 
have discussed the origins of the Asian crisis, and two broad views have emerged: 
the economic fundamentals view and the financial panic view.1 
The economic fundamentals view asserts that the crisis can be attributed to poor 
economic fundamentals such as bad economic policy, overspending in the private 
sector, and associated weaknesses in the financial sector.  In the traditional 
                                                             
1 Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and Ito (1999), among others, provide general discussions on 
the Asian crisis.    See, e.g., Glick (1998), Chang (1998), and Radelet and Sachs (1998) for 
related discussions on these two views.   5 
literature on balance of payment crises, the “first-generation” models (e.g. 
Krugman 1979) argue that a fixed exchange rate regime has to be abandoned if a 
government has a limited international reserve and runs a persistent fiscal deficit 
by printing money.  Hence a currency crisis is an inevitable outcome of 
inconsistent macroeconomic policies.     
  Following a similar line of argument, more recent first-generation literature 
emphasizes a different kind of policy inconsistency, that is, inconsistency between 
maintaining simultaneously the exchange rate peg and domestic financial stability 
in an open economy (e.g. Dooley 2000).  A government insures domestic private 
liabilities to stabilize its financial system.  Given that the exchange rate is fixed, 
foreign as well as domestic investors are willing to purchase these liabilities 
because they are insured by the government.  As the economy becomes 
overheated and domestic credit expands, implicit insurance liabilities of the 
government also increase and eventually reach a limit (i.e. the amount of liabilities 
exceeds the amount of the government’s reserve assets or “insurance fund”) when 
the speculative attack occurs.  Thus a currency crisis is unavoidable and fully 
anticipated.  This is a variant of the fundamentals view and is clearly motivated 
by recent episodes of crises in the emerging markets such as the Asian crisis.   
The financial panic view, on the other hand, argues that economic fundamentals 
were generally sound, or, if not entirely satisfactory, they did not warrant a crisis.  
Instead, international investors suddenly changed their expectations and lost 
confidence about other creditors (i.e. fear that other depositors withdraw their 
investments) and refused to roll over credit, which resulted in a self-fulfilling panic 
and caused a crisis (e.g. Chang and Velasco 2000, 2001).  Note that a crisis need 
not happen in this view.  Nonetheless it can happen when the economy is solvent 
but illiquid internationally.  Given that there is a maturity mismatch where 
short-term international liabilities are greater than short-term assets, any trigger 
– which may or may not be related to economic fundamentals – could cause a   6 
self-fulfilling panic and a subsequent crisis.   This self-fulfilling mechanism and 
its emphasis on the role of market expectations resemble the “second-generation 
model” of currency crises such as Obstfeld (1986). 
Determining which of these two alternative views is correct has important 
implications for public policy, as was stressed in the introductory section above.  
But the task is not as straightforward as it may seem.     
Suppose one or more fundamental economic indicators deteriorated and 
subsequently a currency crisis broke out.2  This does not necessarily mean that 
the crisis inevitably occurred because of bad fundamentals.  It may also be the 
case that fundamentals were not so seriously weakened and therefore did not 
warrant a crisis, but they triggered a self-fulfilling panic of international investors, 
which resulted in a crisis.     
There is a large body of literature on “crisis prediction,” in which researchers 
study whether currency crises are predictable phenomena using one or several 
fundamental economic indicators (e.g. Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 1998; 
Goldfajn and Valdes 1998; Berg and Pattillo 1999).    Even when one can show that 
a set of fundamentals help predict currency crises, the evidence is not necessarily 
useful to determine which of the two views is the root cause for the same reason. 
In the existing literature, Chinn, Dooley, and Shrestha (1999) for instance study 
the first hypothesis empirically.  They examine a central implication of Dooley’s  
insurance model (2000) and show that the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to 
domestic credit, a key variable that measures the relative size of contingent 
liabilities of the government, is highly significant in their panel regression of 
                                                             
2 There were actually many signs of deteriorating fundamentals prior to the Asian crisis in 
affected countries.  They include slower export growth, increased current account deficits, 
appreciation of real exchange rates, increased recognition of vulnerable financial systems 
(such as risky lending practices by nonbank institutions), drops in stock and real estate 
prices, etc.    See, e.g., Ito (1999) for a detailed overview of both common and idiosyncratic 
factors in the Asian crisis.   7 
currency crises in Latin America and East Asia.  Note, however, that while the 
evidence seems to support Dooley’s version of the fundamentals view, it does not 
necessarily deny the financial panic hypothesis, either.  To iterate, there is still a 
possibility that changes in fundamentals did not warrant a crisis, but caused a 
crisis due to a self-fulfilling panic. 
Some studies, on the other hand, present empirical evidence that supports the 
second view.  For example, Chang and Velasco (1998, Table 13) document the 
evidence of international illiquidity that is consistent with the financial panic 
hypothesis.  They indicate the ratios of short-term foreign debt to international 
reserves in the five most-affected ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand) in the pre-crisis period.  A ratio higher than one 
implies that the country is illiquid internationally in the sense that international 
reserves would be insufficient to repay the short-term external liabilities when 
international investors decide not to role it over.  Table 1 replicates the evidence 
presented by Chang and Velasco.  In fact, as of the end of June 1997, the ratio 
exceeded one in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea, while it was less than one in 
Malaysia and the Philippines.  Radelet and Sachs (1998) also examine several 
determinants of financial crises including the short-term debt to reserves ratio and 
show that the ratio is strongly significant in their probit analysis.   
It is indeed suggestive that severe currency crises broke out and the IMF rescue 
packages were actually needed exactly in the three internationally illiquid 
countries in Chang and Velasco’s evidence.  But nevertheless we cannot fully 
assure that the evidence is in support of the financial panic view over the 
fundamentals view.  To really support the financial panic view, we must further 
claim that these currency crises need not have happened.  In other words, these 
affected countries must be shown as internationally solvent as well. 
These considerations motivate our formal analysis of external solvency focusing 
on the three affected countries, namely, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea.   If these   8 
countries satisfied the solvency condition, this would actually support the financial 
panic view as they were already indicated as internationally illiquid.    If, however, 
they were shown as insolvent prior to the crisis, the fundamentals view would be a 
more reasonable explanation.  A formal test of external borrowing constraints 
would therefore be a useful device to differentiate between these two hypotheses.  
The next section explains details of our econometric framework. 
 
3. Econometric Framework   
We now describe the analytical framework based on external borrowing 
constraints of an economy.  We apply testing procedures developed in the 
literature relating to government solvency problems (e.g. Hamilton and Flavin 
1986; Hakkio and Rush 1991; Haug 1991; Trehan and Walsh 1991; and Ahmed 
and Rogers 1995).  Among others, Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Ahmed and 
Rogers (1995) discuss a more general, stochastic environment and examine the 
sustainability of external deficits as well as government deficits.  This paper 
adopts these two approaches. 
We first explain the framework presented by Ahmed and Rogers.  The current 
period budget constraint of an economy is expressed as: 
1 1 1          t t t t t t t B B Y B r I C              (1) 
where  t C  is consumption,  t I  is investment,  t r  is the one-period interest rate, 
t B   is external debt, and  t Y   is output, all in real terms.3  
Forward substitutions of (1) yield the intertemporal budget constraint with 
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3  The term for changes in foreign currency reserves is abstracted from this derivation.   
The testing frameworks here will be unaffected as long as the series is stationary.    And 
later in footnote 8, we actually confirm the stationarity of this series from unit root tests.     9 
where  t X  and  t M  are exports and imports in real terms and  t t M X  = 
t t t I C Y   .  Then we denote  j t s ,  as marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption in period t and t+j: 
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and assume that the Euler equation from the consumer’s optimization problem 
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When the limit term on the right-hand side of equation (4) is equal to zero, the 
external debt outstanding equals the expected present value of the future net 
surplus.  This rules out the possibility of bubble financing of the economy and is 
also known as no-Ponzi game condition.    The country is solvent if this condition is 
satisfied.  
To derive a testable implication, we take the first difference of (4), yielding: 
  1 1 , 1 1 ,
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Under some certain (and plausible) conditions, Ahmed and Rogers demonstrated 
that the presence of a cointegrating relationship in ( t X , t M ,  1 1   t t B r ) with the 
cointegration vector (1, -1, -1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
present-value budget constraint to hold (i.e. the limit term in equation (4) and 
therefore two limit terms in equation (5) are zero).4   
The approach by Trehan and Walsh (1991) is also based on a similar stochastic 
                                                             
4  Key assumptions are (i) Xt and Mt are characterized as a unit root stochastic process or 
integrated of order one (I(1)); (ii) marginal utility of consumption (u’(Ct) ) follows a random 
walk; (iii) covariance between  j t s ,   and future exports and imports series (i.e. j t X   or 
j t M  ) takes a fixed time-invariant value; and (iv) the behavior of external debt (Bt ) is 
considered as  t
t
t t u B B       O P 1  where P   is a constant,    1  O , and  t u  is  a 
covariance-stationary disturbance term.   10 
setup.    They demonstrate that if  t r  is a stochastic process strictly bounded below 
G   ) 0 ( ! G  in expected value and  1   t t B B  is a stationary process, the external 
budget constraint is satisfied.  Thus stationarity of  1   t t B B  is a sufficient 
condition for the external solvency in the Trehan-Walsh framework. 5  Note that 
in this approach no assumptions are required in terms of the data generating 
process of the individual  t X  or  t M   series.  We will employ these two 
frameworks below for the case of the Asian crisis.       
 
4. Empirical Results   
4.1. Data 
  We use quarterly observations for the pre-crisis period of 1976:1-1997:2 for 
Thailand, 1981:1-1997:2 for Indonesia, and 1976:1-1997:3 for Korea, taken from 
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF.6  The series for  t X ,  t M , 
and  1 1   t t B r  are exports of goods and services, imports of goods and services, and 
net interest payments, respectively.  The change in external debt ( 1   t t B B ) is 
measured as the financial account in the IFS which includes net direct investment, 
net portfolio investment, and other net investment, all from abroad.  All the data 
are deflated by consumer prices.7  The time series of these current account and 
                                                             
5  This is Proposition 2 of Trehan and Walsh (1991, p. 215).    The basic argument here is 
that when  1   t t B B   is stationary, the expected value of external debt outstanding  t B , 
which is the numerator of the limit term, grows at most according to a linear trend.    On 
the other hand, the discount rate of future external debt in expected value is 
) 1 ( 1 1      3 k t
j
k t r E and therefore the denominator of the limit term grows exponentially.   
Thus the present discounted value of future debt converges to zero and the budget 
constraint is satisfied. 
6  The starting date for each country is given due to the availability of the IFS dataset.   
The sample period ends in the quarter prior to the period each country introduced the 
floating exchange rate regime: July 1997 for Thailand, August 1997 for Indonesia, and 
December 1997 for Korea.   
7  The IFS codes for these data are as follows: 78aad plus 78add for exports, 78abd plus 
78aed for imports, 78ahd minus 78agd for net interest payments, 78bjd for changes in 
external debt, and 64 for consumer prices.     11 
external debt data for three countries are displayed in Figures 1, 2, and 3.    Graph 
A shows exports (solid line) and imports (dashed line), Graph B net interest 
payments, and Graph C external debt (i.e. the cumulative sum of the flow data 
with the initial value being set to zero). 
 
4.2. Solvency test I: Cointegration test among exports, imports, and net interest 
payments 
We first perform the solvency test by Ahmed and Roger (1995), i.e. testing 
whether a cointegrating relation among exports, imports, and net interest 
payments with the cointegrating vector (1, -1, -1) is supported by the pre-crisis 
data in the three countries.     
As a preliminary step, we check whether each of the variables are treated as I(1).   
Here two unit root tests are implemented: the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
(1979) of a unit root against no unit root (ADF), and a modified Dickey-Fuller test 
based on GLS detrending series (DF-GLS), which is a powerful univariate test 
proposed by Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996).    Those tests include a constant 
term and a linear trend for the series in levels (i.e. detrended tests) and a constant 
term only for the series in first differences (i.e. demeaned tests).  For Indonesia, 
demeaned tests are performed for these series in levels because a time trend is not 
apparent, as indicated in Graphs A and B in Figure 2.    The lag length is chosen by 
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for both of these tests (up to six lags).     
Table 2 presents unit root test results (see the notes to the table for the 
appropriate critical values used here).  While each of the two tests does not reject 
the null of a unit root for the level series, strong rejections are generally found for 
the first differenced series.  We therefore consider that the variables  t X , t M , and 
1 1   t t B r   can be all characterized as I(1).8 
                                                             
8  As another preliminary step, we check the stationarity of changes in foreign currency   12 
Then we test for a cointegration among those three variables with the 
cointegrating vector (1, -1, -1).  When that cointegrating vector is imposed, the 
cointegration test here simply becomes a unit root test for the univariate  t X － t M
－ 1 1   t t B r  series.  The two unit root tests (ADF and DF-GLS) are again used in 
this analysis.    The tests include a constant term and the lag is chosen by the BIC.   
In this analysis, we examine not only the full sample but also a subsample 
spanning before rapid capital inflows appeared in each country: 1976:1-1988:4 for 
Thailand, and 1981:1-1993:4 for Indonesia and Korea (see Graph C in each figure).   
Furthermore, we use a subsample that ends one year before the breakout of each 
crisis to see if the crises were anticipated a year before. 
Table 3 shows the test results.    The null is rejected by these two tests for almost 
all the cases in Indonesia and Korea (see Panels B and C).    The results imply that 
the solvency condition was generally satisfied for the pre-crisis period in the two 
countries.    As for Thailand, the null is rejected for the 1988 subsample, but not for 
the 1996 subsample and the full sample.  This suggests that in Thailand, while 
the external borrowing constraint was satisfied until the late 1980s, this was not 
the case after massive capital inflows took place in the 1990s.  We interpret this 
evidence as indicating that the Thai crisis in July 1997 inevitably occurred because 
Thailand was externally insolvent at that time.  Accordingly, the fundamentals 
view may be credible in Thailand.  For Indonesia and Korea, the financial panic 
view seems more plausible as these countries were shown as internationally 
solvent but nevertheless were hit by a currency crisis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
reserves in each country (see footnote 3).    We perform the same unit root tests for the 
series of changes in reserve assets, which is placed “below the line” on the balance of 
payment table (IFS code 79dbd ), and find that the null is rejected in each country.    For 
instance, demeaned DF-GLS statistics are -2.54, -2.67, and -8.58 for Thailand, Indonesia, 
and Korea, respectively, and indicate strong rejections at 5 or 1% levels.    We therefore 
interpret that the stationarity assumption is generally supported by the data.     13 
4.3. Solvency test II: Unit root test for the changes in external debt 
Next we conduct the solvency test of Trehan and Walsh (1991), where the 
stationarity of  1   t t B B  is examined.  We once again use the two unit root tests 
(ADF and DF-GLS) for  1   t t B B  series in each country.  The tests include a 
constant and the lag is selected by the BIC.  The same subsample periods are 
used in this exercise. 
Table 4 shows the test results.  In the case of Thailand (Panel A), the null of a 
unit root is strongly rejected for the 1976:1-1988:4 period, which implies that the 
country’s external solvency condition had been satisfied before massive capital 
inflows began.  With the full sample, we detect a weak rejection (10% level) by 
DF-GLS, while with the 1996 subsample, no rejections are found from either of the 
two tests.  This suggests that around 1996, the economy was actually insolvent 
and capital outflows began in the early 1997 period, which may lead to this weak 
rejection result with the full sample.  For Indonesia and Korea, we consistently 
find rejections from DF-GLS tests with all sample periods examined.  Since 
DF-GLS is a more powerful procedure than ADF, we interpret this evidence as 
indicating that the external solvency is generally supported in the two countries.     
 
4.4. Analysis extending to the post-crisis period 
This subsection extends our main analysis to the post-crisis period.    We perform 
the same solvency tests as above (i.e. unit root tests for  t X － t M － 1 1   t t B r  and 
1   t t B B ) to see whether there is any change in the empirical results after the 
crisis episodes.  The extended sample period is 1976:1-2001:2 for Thailand, 
1981:1-2001:1 for Indonesia, and 1976:1-2001:3 for Korea.     
Table 5 summarizes the test results.  It is noteworthy that with this updated, 
post-crisis sample, we find strong rejections in Thailand from both tests.  This 
actually indicates that in a couple of years of post-crisis adjustments, the Thai 
economy again becomes externally solvent.   For Indonesia and Korea, the tests   14 
generally detect rejections, and therefore the economies remain solvent 
internationally.  This suggests that a currency crisis need not happen at this 
moment in any of these Asian countries.9 
 
4.5. Further robustness check 
  We further perform several other exercises to check robustness of our main 
findings.10    First, in solvency test I, we use different series for exports and imports 
that incorporate transfer receipts and payments, respectively.11  With these 
exports and imports series, the same cointegration tests are performed for the 
same pre- and post-crisis sample periods.  But the empirical results obtained 
above are all unaffected.   
Next, in solvency test II, we employ different capital flows data that exclude 
direct investments from abroad.12  This may be of interest because in the Asian 
crisis episodes, many observers emphasize the role of relatively short-term capital 
flows such as security investments and deposits rather than long-term direct 
investments.  We conduct the same unit root tests for the new series, but again 
the results are similar with both pre- and post-crisis samples.   
Third, back to solvency test I, we perform the cointegration analysis in an 
unrestricted ( t X , t M ,  1 1   t t B r ) system (i.e. without imposing the cointegrating 
                                                             
9  Note further that a liquidity crisis is not likely to happen, either, in any of these countries. 
The ratios of short-term external debt to foreign reserves (i.e. the data shown in Table 1) 
have been lowered considerably in the post-crisis period.    As of June 2001, the ratios are 
0.302, 0.649, and 0.320 for Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea, respectively, and are all well 
below one.    They no longer indicate international illiquidity according to Chang and 
Velasco (1998). 
10  The detailed results in this subsection are available from the author on request. 
11 Both transfer series are taken from IFS (data codes are 78ajd and 78akd, respectively). 
Note that the transfer payments series in Indonesia is unavailable, so that only the exports 
series differs from the main analysis for Indonesia.    Preliminary unit root tests indicate 
that the new exports and imports series can be characterized as I(1). 
12  We substract net direct investments (IFS code 78bdd and 78bed) from the financial 
account data used above.     15 
vector (1, -1, -1)).  We implement residual-based ADF tests for cointegration.13 
With this unrestricted model, some rejections indicated in Table 2 are not detected. 
We interpret this as primarily being due to low power of the tests in a larger 
three-variable system.14  Actually when we conduct the similar tests under a 
bivariate ( t X ,  t M + 1 1   t t B r ) model, some of these rejections reemerge.  This 
suggests that the advantage in terms of power in a more restricted, smaller system 
is particularly significant for our finite-sample exercises.  Accordingly, our main 
results based on the univariate tests, which presumably have the largest power, 
look all the more reliable.   
 
5. Concluding Discussions 
  The paper has focused on two alternative views on the origins of the Asian crisis 
that have been stressed in the literature: the economic fundamentals view and the 
financial panic view.  It has attempted to determine which of these hypotheses 
best applies to the Asian crisis by testing external solvency of the relevant 
countries.  We have adopted procedures developed by Ahmed and Rogers (1995) 
and Trehan and Walsh (1991) and examined the three most-affected countries: 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea.  The evidence indicates that while the external 
solvency condition was generally satisfied in Indonesia and Korea throughout the 
pre-crisis period, it was not in the case of Thailand for a pre-crisis sample 
extending to the 1990s when massive capital inflows took place and external 
liabilities of the economy became unsustainable. This suggests that the Thai crisis 
inevitably broke out due to weak fundamentals and that the crises in Indonesia 
and Korea were caused by the financial panic of international investors. 
                                                             
13  Detrended tests are performed for Thailand and Korea because their exports and 
imports series may contain a linear trend.    As for Indonesia, we use demeaned tests 
because a time trend is not apparent in Indonesian exports and imports. 
14  This is most notably in Korea.    Yet robust rejections are generally found in Indonesia.     16 
    The econometric approach may appear overly simple as the testing procedures 
involve only current account and capital account series.   But arguably, it is not as 
simplistic as it would seem.  As seen in equations (1) and (2), key macroeconomic 
variables such as private consumption and investment are at least implicitly 
incorporated in the framework.  Thus, those external accounts profiles reflect 
current and expected spending (possibly overspending) by the private sector or the 
government.  
Moreover, the spending behavior in turn can be linked with the general state of 
the economy and/or asset price fluctuations (such as the overheating of the 
economy and a subsequent burst of asset price bubbles), and this would affect the 
soundness of the financial system.    These factors are usually seen as important in 
the Asian crisis episodes and are incorporated in the present framework through 
the spending behavior of the economy.  Note further that spending decisions by 
the private sector are implicitly influenced by fluctuations in relative prices and 
real exchange rates that take place behind the scene.   
The idea here is that all those interactions among key variables are summarized 
into the simple framework based on external borrowing constraints.    We therefore 
view the present approach as not only simple and tractable but also reasonably 
general and suitable to investigate the origins of the Asian crisis.   
  Before we conclude, we have two additional remarks on the interpretations of 
our main findings.    The first is that the evidence would also be consistent with the 
“contagion” of the Asian crisis.15   The main results seem to indicate that the Thai 
crisis, which broke out for the fundamentals reasons, triggered a self-fulfilling 
panic in Indonesia and subsequently in Korea.  Put differently, the Asian crisis 
spread from the solvency crisis in Thailand to the liquidity crises in Indonesia and 
                                                             
15  There is also a large amount of literature on this issue.    For instance, Baig and 
Goldfajn (1999) examined the contagion focusing on the correlation of the financial 
markets in the region.   17 
Korea.  This interpretation may provide additional insight on the mechanism of 
the Asian crisis episodes. 
Second, it must be emphasized that with the present approach we are still 
unable to perfectly predict future crises.  Even when a country is shown as 
externally solvent, we cannot rule out the possibility of a liquidity crisis just as 
suggested in the cases of Indonesia and Korea.  Given that some crises are 
actually driven by self-fulfilling financial panic, institutional arrangements to 
strengthen the facility of an international lender of last resort must be seriously 
discussed.    While such an effort intends to reduce the likelihood of liquidity crises, 
we should be fully aware that this could potentially induce moral hazard behavior 
of international investors or governments and consequently could raise the 
likelihood of solvency crises.  Extra cautions therefore must be exercised to 
develop such an international architecture to prevent future crises of both types. 
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Table 1. Short-Term External Debt to Reserves Ratio   
———————————————————————————————————————— 
P e r i o d      T h a i l a n d      I n d o n e s i a      K o r e a      M a l a y s i a    P h i l i p p i n e s       
———————————————————————————————————————— 
 
1990-Q2  0.535 2.238 1.128  0.222 3.232 
        
1991-Q2  0.754 1.689 1.632  0.220 1.121 
        
1992-Q2  0.743 1.474 1.796  0.253 0.901 
        
1993-Q2  0.782 1.763 1.523  0.359 0.492 
        
1994-Q2  0.992 1.724 1.610  0.252 0.405 
        
1995-Q2  1.125 1.967 1.814  0.275 0.552 
        
1996-Q2  1.233 1.899 1.706  0.391 0.704 
        
1997-Q2  1.506 1.800 2.117  0.597 0.927 
 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
Notes: This table replicates the evidence on international illiquidity shown by Chang and 
Velasco (1998, Table 13).  It reports the ratio of short-term external debt to international 
reserves at the end of the second quarter (June) of each year.  Short-term debt is the series  
“liabilities to banks, due within a year” taken from the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) statistics on external debt, and international reserves series is retrieved from IMF 
International Financial Statistics (line 1d.d).     
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Table 2. Unit Root Test Results   
―  For exports, imports, and net interest payments  ― 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
Variable                 A D F                 D F - G L S  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
A. Thailand 
Xt                  - 1 . 9 7 ( 4 )               - 1 . 4 5 ( 4 )  
Mt               -1.82(2)              - 1 . 5 3 ( 2 )  
            rt-1Bt - 1                               - 0 . 5 4 ( 3 )                    - 1 . 3 0 ( 3 )  
ΔXt                  - 2 . 8 4 ( 3 ) †            - 2 . 8 3 ( 3 ) * *  
ΔMt               -4.12(1)**             - 4 . 1 5 ( 1 ) * *  
            Δrt-1Bt - 1                            - 1 2 . 3 5 ( 2 ) * *                 - 1 . 3 6 ( 4 )  
 
B. Indonesia 
Xt                  - 2 . 1 8 ( 4 )               - 0 . 9 6 ( 4 )  
Mt               -1.91(5)              - 1 . 3 5 ( 5 )  
            rt-1Bt - 1                               - 2 . 1 8 ( 1 )                    - 1 . 3 4 ( 4 )  
ΔXt                  - 3 . 2 5 ( 3 ) *              - 3 . 2 8 ( 3 ) * *  
ΔMt               -2.56(4)              - 1 . 6 4 ( 4 ) † 
            Δrt-1Bt - 1                            - 1 3 . 2 5 ( 0 ) * *                 - 1 2 . 8 3 ( 0 ) * *  
 
C. Korea 
Xt                  - 2 . 6 2 ( 4 )               - 2 . 6 8 ( 4 )  
Mt               -2.46(5)              - 2 . 4 0 ( 5 )  
            rt-1Bt - 1                               - 1 . 7 3 ( 3 )                    - 1 . 8 0 ( 3 )  
ΔXt                  - 2 . 8 0 ( 3 ) †            - 2 . 0 6 ( 3 ) *  
ΔMt               -3.31(6)*             - 2 . 6 9 ( 6 ) * *   
            Δrt-1Bt - 1                            - 7 . 4 3 ( 2 ) * *                  - 6 . 8 0 ( 2 ) * *  
————————————————————————————————————————— 
Notes: This table reports statistics testing for a unit root for exports (Xt ), imports (Mt ), 
and net interest payments (rt-1Bt-1), all deflated by CPI, in the three Asian countries.  
ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (1979) of a unit root against no unit root and 
DF-GLS is a Dickey-Fuller test based on GLS-detrended series, proposed by Elliott, 
Rothenberg, and Stock (1996).  The tests include a constant and a linear trend for the 
series in levels (i.e. detrended tests) and a constant term only for the series in first 
differences (i.e. demeaned tests).  As for Indonesia, demeaned tests are performed for 
the series in levels since a linear trend is not apparent in Figure 2.    The sample period is 
1976:1-1997:2 for Thailand, 1981:1-1997:2 for Indonesia, and 1976:1-1997:3 for Korea. 
The lag lengths shown in the parentheses are chosen based on the BIC (up to six lags).  
Critical values, tabulated by Fuller (1976) and Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996), are:   
                         1 0 % ( †)  5%(*)  1%(**)  
         D e t r e n d e d   A D F       - 3 . 1 5    - 3 . 4 5    - 4 . 4 0  
                   D F - G L S    - 2 . 7 4    - 3 . 0 3    - 3 . 5 8  
         D e m e a n e d   A D F       - 2 . 5 8    - 2 . 8 9    - 3 . 5 1  
                   DF-GLS   -1.61   -1.95   -2.60 
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Table 3. Solvency Test I   
―  Cointegration tests among exports, imports, and net interest payments  ― 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
P e r i o d                  A D F                D F - G L S  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
A. Thailand 
                       
         76:1-88:4               - 3 . 3 7 ( 0 ) * *          - 2 . 8 3 ( 0 ) * *          
         76:1-96:2            -0.54(4)            - 0 . 0 3 ( 4 )          
         76:1-97:2            -1.90(4)            - 1 . 3 2 ( 4 )          
 
B. Indonesia 
                    
           81:1-93:4                  - 2 . 7 6 ( 4 ) †                - 2 . 0 5 ( 4 ) *    
           8 1 : 1 - 9 6 : 2                   - 2 . 9 5 ( 4 ) *                  - 1 . 8 8 ( 4 ) †   
           8 1 : 1 - 9 7 : 2                   - 3 . 1 2 ( 4 ) *                  - 1 . 9 9 ( 4 ) *    
 
C. Korea 
                       
           7 6 : 1 - 9 3 : 4                   - 2 . 6 3 ( 0 ) †                - 2 . 4 1 ( 0 ) *    
           7 6 : 1 - 9 6 : 3                   - 2 . 5 3 ( 0 )                   - 2 . 4 3 ( 0 ) *    
           7 6 : 1 - 9 7 : 3                   - 3 . 0 5 ( 0 ) *                  - 2 . 9 2 ( 0 ) * *    
        
———————————————————————————————————————— 
Notes: This table reports statistics testing for cointegration among exports, imports, and 
net interest payments with cointegrating vector (1, -1, -1), i.e. testing for a unit root for Xt
－Mt－rt-1Bt-1.    ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (1979) of a unit root against no 
unit root and DF-GLS is a Dickey-Fuller test based on GLS-detrended series, proposed by 
Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996).  Those tests include a constant term (i.e. 
demeaned tests).  The lag lengths shown in the parentheses are chosen based on BIC 
(up to six lags).    Critical values, tabulated by Fuller (1976) and Elliott, Rothenberg, and 
Stock (1996), are: 
                         1 0 % ( †)  5%(*)  1%(**)  
                A D F      - 2 . 5 8     - 2 . 8 9    - 3 . 5 1  
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Table 4. Solvency Test II 
―  Unit root tests for changes in external debt  ― 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
P e r i o d                   A D F                D F - G L S  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
A. Thailand 
                       
         76:1-88:4              - 5 . 4 7 ( 0 ) * *          - 5 . 4 3 ( 0 ) * *          
         76:1-96:2              -0.06(2)             0 . 2 9 ( 2 )          
         76:1-97:2              -2.20(1)            -1.94(1)†        
 
B. Indonesia 
                    
           81:1-93:4                    - 2 . 2 3 ( 4 )                   - 2 . 0 6 ( 4 ) *    
           8 1 : 1 - 9 6 : 2                     - 2 . 4 6 ( 4 )                   - 2 . 0 3 ( 4 ) *    
           8 1 : 1 - 9 7 : 2                     - 2 . 2 9 ( 4 )                   - 1 . 7 8 ( 4 ) †   
 
C. Korea 
                       
           7 6 : 1 - 9 3 : 4                     - 2 . 4 9 ( 1 )                   - 2 . 2 8 ( 1 ) *    
           7 6 : 1 - 9 6 : 3                     - 2 . 3 8 ( 1 )                   - 2 . 3 5 ( 1 ) *  
           7 6 : 1 - 9 7 : 3                     - 2 . 4 9 ( 1 )                   - 2 . 4 5 ( 1 ) *  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
Notes: This table reports statistics testing for a unit root for changes in external debt (Bt
－Bt-1).  ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (1979) of a unit root against no unit 
root and DF-GLS is a Dickey-Fuller test based on GLS-detrended series, proposed by 
Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996).    The tests include a constant term (i.e. demeaned 
tests).    The lag lengths shown in the parentheses are chosen based on the BIC (up to six 
lags).  Critical values, tabulated by Fuller (1976) and Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock 
(1996), are: 
                          1 0 % ( †)  5%(*)  1%(**)  
                A D F       - 2 . 5 8     - 2 . 8 9    - 3 . 5 1  
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Table 5. Additional Results   
―  For samples extended to the post-crisis period  ― 
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Variable             A D F                 D F - G L S  
——————————————————————————————————————— 
A. Thailand 
                       
         Xt－Mt－rt-1Bt-1          -3.09(4)*           - 2 . 9 1 ( 4 ) * *          
          B t－Bt-1              -2.75(0)†            - 2 . 7 4 ( 0 ) * *          
 
B. Indonesia 
                    
         Xt－Mt－rt-1Bt-1          -2.60(4)†            - 2 . 1 3 ( 4 ) *          
          B t－Bt-1              -4.05(0)**            - 3 . 7 9 ( 0 ) * *          
 
C. Korea 
                       
         Xt－Mt－rt-1Bt-1          -2.80(0)†            - 2 . 5 4 ( 0 ) *          
          B t－Bt-1              -5.88(0)**            - 5 . 6 7 ( 0 ) * *          
——————————————————————————————————————— 
Notes: This table reports statistics testing for a unit root for Xt－Mt－rt-1Bt-1 and Bt－Bt-1 
(i.e. the solvency tests I and II) for updated samples extending to the post-crisis period.  
The sample period is 1976:1-2001:2 for Thailand, 1981:1-2001:1 for Indonesia, and 
1976:1-2001:3 for Korea. ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (1979) of a unit root 
against no unit root and DF-GLS is a Dickey-Fuller test based on GLS-detrended series, 
proposed by Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996).  The tests include a constant term 
(i.e. demeaned tests).    The lag lengths shown in the parentheses are chosen based on the 
BIC (up to six lags).    Critical values, tabulated by Fuller (1976) and Elliott, Rothenberg, 
and Stock (1996), are: 
                          1 0 % ( †)  5%(*)  1%(**)  
                A D F       - 2 . 5 8     - 2 . 8 9    - 3 . 5 1  
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Figure 1. Current Account and External Debt in Thailand 
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  Figure 2．Current Account and External Debt in Indonesia 
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  Figure 3．Current Account and External Debt in Korea 
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